From 2004 to 2012, the German social health insurance levied a co-payment for the first doctor visit in a calendar quarter. We develop a new model for estimating the effect of such a co-payment on the individual number of visits per quarter. The model combines a one-time increase in the otherwise constant hazard rate determining the timing of doctor visits with a difference-in-differences strategy to identify the reform effect. An extended version of the model accounts for a mismatch between reporting period and calendar quarter. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we do not find an effect of the co-payment on demand for doctor visits.
INTRODUCTION
Around 90% of the German population receive their health insurance coverage through the German statutory health insurance system (SHI). Before 2004, the SHI did not require any co-payment for doctor visits, although prescription drugs were subject to cost sharing for many years. Starting January 1, 2004, the insured had to pay a 10 euro fee for the first visit to a doctor in each calendar quarter ('Praxisgebühr'). Additional visits in the same quarter were free of charge. Thus, the individual out-of-pocket expense became a nonlinear function of utilization, dropping from 10 to 0 euros after the first doctor visit in a quarter. Only individuals without any visit to a doctor could avoid paying the quarterly fee. Moreover, the fee did not apply to those with private health insurance (PHI). On January 1, 2013, the co-payment was abolished.
Arguably, the introduction of a co-payment created an incentive to avoid doctor visits in a particular quarter of the year, at least at the extensive margin, for those close to indifference between consulting and not consulting a doctor. One therefore would expect that the probability of visiting a doctor at least once within a quarter should have fallen in the SHI population relative to the unaffected PHI population. By the same token, one might think that the number of doctor visits for those with at least one visit (the conditional-on-positives or intensive margin effect) should be unrelated to the co-payment (see Augurzky et al., 2006 , for such a view) although our analysis in the succeeding text will provide reasons why this is not necessarily the case.
MODELING THE NUMBER OF DOCTOR VISITS
In this section, we derive the distribution of the individual number of visits Y i during a fixed time interval .0; T / representing a calendar quarter (i.e., T D 90 if time is measured in days). Suppose that sickness events arrive according to a Poisson process with constant rate i . The total number of sickness events N i during a quarter is then Poisson distributed with mean i T . Let X ij 2 f0; 1g denote the individual decision to visit a doctor .X ij D 1/ or not .X ij D 0/ at the j -th sickness event. The decision is made by comparing two utilities, utility u 1 ij with a visit and utility u 0 ij without. Utility depends on net income (after deducting direct cost c j ) and health: u The idiosyncratic health improvement from a visit, net of all non-pecuniary cost, has to be at least as large as the marginal utility of income times the pecuniary cost of a visit at sickness event j . Therefore, the probability of a visit is given by
where p.c j / is decreasing in c j as long as˛> 0.
With constant cost c j D c, the probability of a visit is the same for all sickness events, and the total number of visits
has a Poisson distribution with mean i p.c/ (Feller, 2008) . Under the aforementioned reform, only the first visit during a quarter has a price of c > 0, whereas all subsequent visits are for free. Thus, the cost of a visit is path dependent. For example, the cost at the second sickness event can be written as c i2 D c 1.X i1 D 0/, and the probability of a visit at the second event is given by
In general, it holds for all i that Pr.X i1 D 1/ < Pr.X ij D 1/ j D 2; : : : ; N because p.c/ < p.0/. With non-constant probabilities, (1) cannot be Poisson distributed.
To derive the distribution of Y i in this case, it is useful to consider an alternative representation of the problem in terms of the underlying stochastic process. Specifically, Y i is equal to the number of 'renewals' (i.e., completed time spells between visits) during a fixed time interval. Inter-arrival times for a Poisson process are exponentially distributed. The nonlinear pricing introduces a one-time jump in the hazard rate: i0 D i p.c/ is the hazard rate for the time to first visit, and i1 D i p.0/ that for the duration between subsequent visits. Under the assumptions of the model, i0 < i1 . This 'non-stationarity' implies that the model does not correspond to a standard renewal process, and a new type of count data model is obtained.
The distribution of the number of visits
For simplicity of notation, we drop the i subscript in the following three subsections. Given the previous assumptions, the time of the first visit t has an exponential distribution with rate 0 , whereas the number of further visits during the quarter between t and T is Poisson distributed with rate 1 , Y.t; T / P oisson. 1 .T t//. Therefore, for k 1, the total number of visits during a quarter has probability function
where a first visit occurs between 0 and T , if at all, and we integrate over all these possible times. If we could observe t, we would directly estimate the parameters using the terms under the integral, Pr.Y D k 1jt; t < T I 1 / and f .tI 0 /. Our model applies to the case, where t is unobserved, as is typically the case in general-purpose household or health surveys where just the number, and not the times, of visits is recorded. Note that the time of first visit is not a choice variable in our model. It results from the interplay between a stochastic sickness arrival process (which is unaffected by the co-payment) and a utility maximizing choice that trades off the instantaneous health benefit of a visit with its monetary cost. One can show (e.g., Janardan, 1980, or Baetschmann and Winkelmann, 2016 ) that the integral (2) has a closed-form solution, and the probability function is given by 
Interpretation of parameters
The parameters of the model have a straightforward interpretation. 0 is the hazard rate for the first visit (or 'stage 0' hazard), and 1 the hazard rate for subsequent visits (or 'stage 1' hazard). For instance, parameterizing 0 D exp.x 0ˇ0 /, where x is a .k 1/ vector of covariates andˇ0 a conformable vector of regression parameters, 0 x is the approximate relative change in 0 associated with a small change in x. In the context of twopart or zero-inflated models,ˇ0 andˇ1 are often denoted as 'extensive margin' and 'intensive margin' effects, respectively. The mean of the model has generic form E.Y .0; T // D Pr.y > 0/ C E t OEEY .t; T /; 0 Ä t Ä T Because EY.t; T / D 1 .T t/, where T t is the time from the first visit to the end of the calendar quarter, the intensive margin effect depends not only on 1 but on the expected duration of stage 1, and thus on 0 , as well. In the model, a co-payment for the first visit means that it tends to happen later, leaving less time for accumulating further visits. It is therefore the case that the number of visits after the first visit is affected by the co-payment, even if 1 is not. Using properties of the Poisson and exponential distributions, we obtain the following closed-form expression for the mean:
where f .yI 1 / denotes the probability function of a standard count data model, for example, Poisson or negative binomial distribution, and p 0 . 0 / is a complementary log-log model. Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) argue that such a hurdle model can be appropriate for modeling the demand for health care. In their interpretation, the first contact decision for a general practitioner often triggers a number of re-appointments or referrals to specialists that are subject to a different mechanism and thus a different . The standard hurdle model is not derived from an underlying stochastic process, however. It treats 0 and 1 as unrelated parameters that can be separately estimated. It ignores the random timing of the first visit, and thus the effect of 0 on the length of the period for which visits have a zero co-payment. In a fixed hurdle model, conditional-on-positives expressions such as Pr.Y D yjY > 0; x/ or E.Y jY > 0; x/ depend on 1 only, not on 0 . It therefore rules out spillover effects and cannot address path dependence generated by nonlinear pricing. By contrast, the dynamic hurdle model (3) naturally accounts for the timing of the first visit. The co-payment leads to a lower stage 0 rate and decreases the expected time available for subsequent visits. Although the timing of the first visit is unobserved, the corresponding count data model can be derived under the maintained assumptions. In the application later in the text, we provide results for both fixed and dynamic hurdle models. While we argue that the dynamic model is a priori preferable, it is of course possible that the underlying assumptions justifying the model are not satisfied in this particular application.
Identifying the effect of a co-payment on demand
In general, the two rates of the model can be expressed as functions of a number of exogenous factors x, such as prior health status, income, gender, and employment status. Suppose that i0 D exp.x However, attributing any such difference in rates to the existence of a co-payment for the first visit requires the absence of other explanations. But there are a number of factors that can rationalize a low initial rate and a higher one thereafter. Perhaps, the leading explanation has been explored in the aforementioned paper by Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) , where visits occur in clusters and a first visit is followed by additional appointments for a given sickness spell. Thus, a more convincing identification strategy uses DiD. Specifically, the co-payment did apply between 2004 and 2012 for those covered by SHI. Privately insured people were not affected and can serve as control group. We consider the following hazard rate specification: 2003; 2005; 2011; 2013 where Â t;j are year dummies (2003 is dropped) and COPAY it is a dummy variable equal to one if the person is covered by SHI and the year is either 2005 or 2011, and else equal to zero. Thus, COPAY it D 1 indicates active treatment, andˇ2 ;0 is the extensive margin treatment effect under the 'parallel trends assumption'. This assumption implies that the counterfactual hazard rate for a first visit for the SHI population in the absence of a co-payment is equal to the actual SHI rate when no co-payment was in place (e.g., in 2003) multiplied by the appropriate trend growth factor obtained from the PHI population (e.g., exp.Â 2005;0 /). Similarly, one could formulate a DiD model to estimate the effect on the (second) hazard rate for further visits, it;1 . This offers a kind of placebo test, as, within the previous model, the reform did not change the incentives conditional on a first visit, and no effect should therefore be observed (i.e., the null hypothesis H 0 Wˇ2 ;1 D 0 should not be rejected). There are good reasons not to put too much weight on such a test, though. First, there was a concurrent increase in the co-payments for prescription drugs on January 1, 2004, and we know from previous research that such out-of-pocket expenses tend to reduce the number of doctor visits as well (Winkelmann, 2004) . Second, a referral from the first doctor was needed in order to receive free consultations by further doctors (or specialists). Thus, the co-payment may have increased the time and effort costs of additional visits.
Dealing with mismatch
The empirical analysis is based on information from the SOEP on the number of visits 'during the previous 3 months'. Because interviews typically do not take place at the end of a calendar quarter, the reporting period overlaps with two calendar quarters. As noted by , the standard models are invalid in this case. By contrast, our model prescribes a method to deal with mismatch in a theory-consistent way, owing to the derivation of the dynamic hurdle model from an underlying stochastic process, which the standard hurdle model lacks. Consider a reporting period .0 C r; T C r/ that differs from the calendar quarter .0; T / (e.g., T D 90 if time is measured in days). r 2 .0; T is a known value in our data, because the day of the interview is recorded. Suppose a person gets interviewed on May 1 in a year. In this case, the relevant calendar quarter started on April 1, r D 30, and the reporting period covers the final 2 months of the second quarter and the first month of the third quarter. This situation is illustrated in Figure 1 , where visits are reported for periods B and C , whereas the calendar quarter includes A and B. In this case, the probability of no visit is the product of the probability of no visit in C times the probability of no visit in B, which in turn depends on whether or not a visit has taken place in A. In our model, the probability of a pre-reporting period visit is Pr.Y A > 0/ D 1 exp. 0 r/, and therefore,
and
where Pr.Y B D 0/ is defined in (5). Ignoring mismatch would lead one to assume a different probability expression, in this case exp. 0 T /, and thus a misspecified model. The expressions become more complex for Y 1. The total number of events in the reporting period, Y , is then given by the sum Y D Y B C Y C , and
Equation (7) depends on two probabilities. The second probability is easy to establish because Pr.Y C D k s/ D DH urd le.k sI 0 ; 1 ; r/. The first probability is a mixture of two distributions:
1. There has been at least one visit in A, that is, the arrival time of the first event, t, predates r. In this case, counts in period B follow a Poisson distribution with mean 1 .T r/. 2. The arrival time of the first event exceeds r. In this case, counts in period B follow a dynamic hurdle model with parameters 0 , 1 ; and T r.
Combining terms,
Pr.Y B D s/ D .1 exp. 0 r// P oisson.sI 1 .T r// C exp. 0 r/ DH urd le.sI 0 ; 1 ; T r/ Substituting these expressions into (7), it is clear that
and the model is far from stationary (unless 0 D 1 , of course). The key point is that the standard model assumes observation period and calendar quarter to be identical. If the two diverge, it is not clear whether the hazard of the observation period starts at 0 or at 1 , because we do not know whether or not an event has already taken place in the previous quarter.
As a corollary, all standard models used in the previous literature on first-visit co-payment effects (probit, logit, and hurdle count models) are misspecified, and thus inconsistent when applied to a sample from survey data with mismatched reporting period. For consistent parameter estimation, one can use a subset of observations for which reporting period and calendar quarter are roughly aligned. But this only works if the timing of the interview is random and not correlated with unobservable determinants of health utilization. It is therefore much better to estimate a model, such as the one derived here, that explicitly accounts for mismatch and is consistent even with non-random timing, and otherwise more efficient, by allowing for maximum likelihood estimation using the entire sample.
DATA AND RESULTS
Data have been extracted from the SOEP that is made available by DIW Berlin. Four years are used, 2003, 2005, 2011, and 2013 , and the analysis is restricted to individuals between the ages of 20 and 60 years. We do not impose a balanced panel, nor do we make the assumption of independence of observations across time. This affects the way standard errors should be computed, as we use clustered standard errors throughout. We consider two samples: The 'restricted sample' includes all persons, who were interviewed within˙10 days to the end of a calendar quarter. There are 6,236 such observations. In the restricted sample, the average distance to the nearest end of quarter is around 5 days. The second, the 'full sample', includes all persons regardless of their time of interview. There are 32,888 such observations, and thus more than five times as many as in the restricted sample. The average distance to the nearest end of quarter in the full sample is about 24 days. Table I reports means (and their standard errors) of variables employed in the estimation, separately for treatment group (SHI) and control group (PHI) and the two samples. Civil servants are excluded from the analysis because of their non-standard insurance arrangement. Selection into PHI is primarily based on income, as is evident in Table I , where the mean log household income of PHI individuals is 0.5 higher than that of SHI individuals (in the full sample), corresponding to a 65 percent income difference. PHI individuals are also older on average (by about 3 years), more educated (by about 2 years), and more likely to be male. The regression analyses control for these factors, but the differences still raise the question of the comparability of the two groups, and hence of the validity of the parallel trends assumption underlying the DiD identification strategy. A formal test of this assumption was conducted by , using the same kind of data from the SOEP, and they could not reject the null hypothesis of parallel trends during the pre-treatment years. The bottom panel of Table I splits the two samples further into two subsamples, the treatment years 2005 and 2011 and the non-treatment years 2003 and 2013, and shows for each group the average number of visits as well as the share with at least one visit. The non-treatment sample is somewhat smaller. The reason is that we had to drop all respondents who were surveyed during the first quarter of 2013, because their reporting period overlapped with the abolition of the co-payment by January 1, 2013.
In terms of mean utilization, and using the full sample, we find that the SHI reported on average about 0.05 (or 2.5 percent) more visits in years without the co-payment in place than in years with co-payment. However, a similar trend is observed for the PHI individuals, who report about 0.1 fewer visits on average, so that the naive DiD effect, based on means only, is close to zero. A somewhat noisier picture emerges for the restricted sample, where the size of the control population (417 in treatment years and 310 in non-treatment years) leads to considerably more sampling uncertainty. If we look at the probability of any visit instead -the extensive margin -not much is found either. The probability actually increases somewhat for SHI individuals in years where the co-payment is in place. Of course, it would be premature to dismiss the possibility of a treatment effect based on this descriptive evidence alone.
Baseline result
In a next step, we estimated the fixed and dynamic hurdle Poisson models with a full set of control variables. The upper half of Table II shows the results. In terms of overall fit, the simple Poisson model is clearly inferior to the two-part generalizations that introduce different parameters for the utilization (yes/no) decision and for the intensity of use. The dynamic hurdle model leads to a substantially higher log-likelihood value relative to the fixed hurdle model ( 12,690.4 as compared with 13,252.4). Recall that 0 is the hazard rate for the time to a first visit. The probability of no visit is then equal to the survivor rate exp. 0 /. Hazard rate and survivor rate are inversely related; that is, factors increasing the hazard rate lower the probability of no visit, and vice versa. With the exponential parameterization, the displayed coefficients provide the predicted approximate relative change in the hazard rate associated with a unit change in the associated regressor. The exact relative change is obtained by applying the transformation exp. Ǒ j / 1. For instance, according to the dynamic hurdle model, the hazard rate for a first visit for men is .exp. 0:357/ 1/ 100 D 30 percent below that of women. Their predicted probability of no visit, evaluated at the mean probability of 0.64, is 10 percentage points higher than that of women.
There are some interesting asymmetries between first-visit hazard ( 0 ) and that of subsequent visits ( 1 ). For instance, income has no effect on the former, but a statistically significant negative effect on the latter, where a 10 percent increase in income is predicted to reduce the hazard rate for each further doctor visit by 1.5 percent. Taken at face value, this would mean that health care is an inferior good. More likely, the negative effect is due to a positive correlation between income and unobserved health status, capturing fewer visits by healthier individuals. As expected, individuals with disabilities have higher hazard rates in both states, and thus a higher predicted number of doctor visits than individuals without.
The statistically insignificant point estimate of the treatment effect corresponds to a 1.6 percent reduction in the hazard rate for the first visit. The standard error is large, so sizeable positive or negative effects cannot be ruled out either. This finding is perhaps not too surprising, keeping in mind that a small change in the cost of a visit combined with a potentially low elasticity of demand should not have much of an effect. The effect on the stage 1 hazard (were a narrow interpretation of the model would predict none) is positive and relatively large, but again, the standard error is large, and the coefficient is statistically insignificant as well.
Adding unobserved heterogeneity
All models can be extended to allow for unobserved heterogeneity, for instance, by adding a multiplicative random effect to the exponential rates:
Here, u i captures individual-level differences in the demand for doctor visits, for example, due to differences in latent health. In the context of our dynamic hurdle model, it seems reasonable to assume that the two rates for the first and for subsequent visits are multiplied by the same factor. Moreover, we will assume that the heterogeneity term is the same for repeated observations on the same individual, and thus,
The models discussed in Section 2 now hold conditional on u i . To take the models to the data, the u i term has to be eliminated from the likelihood function by taking expectations. Specifically, suppose that ln u i is normally distributed, independently of x i , with mean 0:5 2 and variance 2 . Then u i is log-normal with E.u i / D 1 and Var.u i / D exp.
2 / 1. The marginal likelihood has no closed-form solution, but it can be numerically approximated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
The lower part of Table II provides estimation results for the three models with log-normal unobserved heterogeneity. In the case of the fixed hurdle model, heterogeneity is introduced only for the conditional-onpositives part, and the 0 estimates are thus identical to those in the upper panel. Clearly, the improvements over the models without unobserved heterogeneity are large and statistically significant across the board. Unobserved heterogeneity changes the log-likelihood ordering of the three models, the fixed hurdle model having the highest log-likelihood in this case.
Point estimates for the important predictors of healthcare utilization, that is, unemployment, disability, and gender, are rather stable, regardless of whether unobserved heterogeneity is allowed for or not. The estimates for the reform effect remain statistically insignificant. Note that our specification imposes that the introduction and the abolition of the co-payment have the same effect size (and opposite sign), an assumption that may be too restrictive. By 2012, many insured, in particular younger ones, had switched to new types of SHI contracts that offered co-payment waivers in return for joining a primary care model. We therefore estimated all models using the introduction sample only (2003 and 2005 , results are available on request), but all substantive conclusions remain unchanged.
Full sample results
We also estimated the adjusted dynamic hurdle model, as discussed in Section 2.5, for the entire sample, in this case based on 32,888 observations. Otherwise, the specification remained unchanged. Results shown here are for the specification without unobserved heterogeneity. For the first visit, or stage 0, we obtained the log of the predicted hazard (with standard errors in parentheses): Male i C other terms
The finding of a large and about evenly distributed disability effect remains robust, as does the pattern that men have a substantially lower stage 0 hazard than women, whereas their stage 1 hazard does not differ much.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper introduced a new econometric model of healthcare demand under nonlinear pricing, based on a Poisson process for the arrival of sickness events. In the model, a co-payment for the first visit during a calendar quarter potentially lowers the hazard rate for the first visit, leaving the subsequent hazard for further visits unchanged. The model was applied to an evaluation of a German healthcare reform of 2004 when a co-payment of 10 euros was introduced for those covered by SHI. The co-payment was again abolished in 2013. In none of our various specifications, with or without unobserved heterogeneity and with or without reporting mismatch, did we find statistically significant effect of the co-payment on the number of doctor visits.
While the results thus are in line with those of two earlier studies by Augurzky et al. (2006) and Schreyögg and Grabka (2010) who also found no effect of the co-payment on utilization, the new methodological approach of this paper offers a number of additional insights that might prove useful for future research in related contexts. For instance, the perspective of a stochastic process is useful to understand that any changes to the first hazard likely also affects the distribution of additional visits, simply because it changes the time left in the quarter to accumulate such visits.
Second, the approach also points towards a theory-consistent way to derive the likelihood of mismatched observations, that is, observations for which reporting period and calendar quarter do not coincide. Such an approach avoids a loss of information incurred by limiting the sample to people interviewed at the end of a calendar quarter and thus increases power. Of course, such data problems could also be addressed by using data from insurance claims rather than survey data. However, such claim data have their own problems. First, they usually include only a very limited set of socioeconomic control variables, precluding certain types of analyses. Furthermore, they often do not allow for a DiD analysis, as it is unlikely that a useful control group can be established in a given claims dataset.
The models discussed in this paper should be useful in a number of other applications as well. For instance, in order to reduce absenteeism, firms have started to offer bonuses to workers with zero sick leave days per year. Depending on how the details of such schemes are designed, they may imply that the first absence is rather costly (the loss of the bonus) whereas subsequent absences have much lower cost. Similar nonlinear pricing schemes can be observed for re-offenses in the context of fare dodging, where fines usually increase after the first offense. Moreover, this paper contributes to the literature on zero-inflated count data that are often encountered in health economic applications, adding a new, alternative model to the existing toolkit.
